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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT I. COHNE, for and on
behalf of himself and all stockholders of RELIANCE
NATIONAL LIFE
I)J"SURANCE COMPANY,
sirnilady situated,

Plointiff and Appellant,
vs.

FRANK B. SALISBURY,

Defendant and Respondent.
TIOBERT I. COHNE, for and on

Case No.

10814

behalf of RELIANCE
~ATIONAL LIFE
I~SURANCE COMPANY,

Pluintif f and Appellant,
vs.

FRANK B. SALISBURY,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Robert I. Cohne, on his own behalf and purporting to act for stockholders of Reliance National Life Insurance Co., appeals from a
judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County
dismissing appellant's complaint against respondent
on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a
1

claim for relief, appellant had waived his claim,
and the action was res judicata.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a complaint in two counts ir
the District Court, Salt Lake County on August 8,
1966. A demand for non-resident security was made
by the respondent and posted. The respondent filed
a motion to dismiss and memorandums were submitted to the trial court. On 28 December, 1966, the
Honorable Merrill C. Faux entered judgment dismissing the appellant's complaint on the basis noted
above.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's complaint alleged that Reliance
National Life Insurance Company was a Utah corporation doing business in several western states
and was merged as a result of some actions of respondent with \Vestern Life Insurance Company
( R. 1) . The action of plain tiff was purportedly
brought on behalf of the stockholders of Reliance
(R. 2), under Rule 23(a) URCP.
The complaint recited that there were three
classes of Reliance stock; Class A, voting; Class AA
non-voting; and Class B, non-voting (R. 2). It fur2

the1· alleged that respondent had been the promoter
of Reliance, president, executive managing officer,
and a director ( R. 2). It was alleged that he owned
30, 068 shares of Class A voting stock which was
76.5 <i( of all the outstanding voting stock of Reliance ( R. 3). It was alleged that respondent in
February, 1964, entered into an agreement to sell
his stock for $60.00 per share to a Delaware corporation known as Financial Investors Corporation
( R. 3) . The stock of Reliance was being traded at
from $26 to $30 per share at the time. As a result
of the sale Financial Investors took over control of
Reliance ( R. 4). It was alleged that thereafter
Financial Investors sold its stock to National Western which merged with Reliance (R. 4). At the
time of the merger appellant alleged that the stockholders of Reliance received $15 per share and at
the time of suit the market value of the representative shares was $7.00 (R. 5). The ~ppellant contended he was entitled to recover the difference between the $60.00 per share paid the respondent and
the $30.00 per share market value at the time of
sale ( R. 5). This was apparently on the theory of
premium of control. Costs and attorney's fees were
also sought.
Count Two alleged the same general facts but
sought to maintain the action under Rule 25 (b)
URCP. The appellant sought judgment in the
amount of $902,040 plus attorneys fees, costs, etc.
(R. 7).
3

The motion to dismiss filed by the respondent
contended the complaint failed to state a claim for
relief, was res judicata based on a prior federal
action between the parties, and that the appellants
were estoppecl to claim relief ( R. 38) .
At the time of hearing on the motion several
exhibits were received into evidence including a
complaint, amended complaint, memorandum decision and judgment in Civil No. C 170-65, Robert
I. Cohne, et al., vs. Frank B. Salsbury, et al., on an
action in the United States District Court, District
of Utah. The \'a1·ious papers filed in the federal
action are designated Exhibit D-1 in the instant
case. The original complaint filed by appellant in
federal court named in addition to respondent, National "\Vestern Life, Financial Investors, and Robert L. Moody, as party defendants. The factual allegations as against the respondent Salisbury covered the same transaction as is complained of in the
instant case (Exhibit D-1, Complaint pp. 1-8). The
appellant purported to base his cause of action on
Section 10 ( b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 USC 78) and Rule lO(b)-5 (17 CFR
240.106-5) promulgated by the Commission. An
amended complaint was thereafter filed again alleging the same facts as appellant claims support
the instant case as well as several other allegations.
A legal conclusion that the transactions complained
were "induced by fraud and misrepresentation" in
violation of 10 (b )-5 were made. Claim was also
4

made for recovery unde1· the pendent jurisdiction
of the federal court on any common law or state
claim that may be raised by the facts (Exhibit
D-1), Amended Complaint p. 5). However, on
March 7, 1966, the appellant, who had initially in\·oked the fede1·al court's pendent jurisdiction, expressly waived any pendent claims and that portion
of the complaint was stricken (See Amended Complaint, Exhibit D-1, p. 5).
A motion to dismiss was filed in the federal
action and after prolonged consideration by the trial
court on 6 July, 1966, Judge A. Sherman Christensen en te1·ed a memorandum decision which recited:
'·I have concluded, in view of the cases
cited by counsel in the briefs and in reasonable interpretation of the statute, that there
can be no recovery under the allegations of
the complaint of a premium on profits from
a sale of control; that a sufficient 10 (b)
claim is not stated; that there is no reliance
shown by any purchaser or sel}er of any security or in connection with a purchase or
sale; that the merger as pleaded is not a sale,
nor was it effected in connection with a sale
of securities within the contemplation of the
statute, and that the theory of fraud in connection with proxy solicitations does not sustain plaintiff's claims as stated."
On September 22, 1966, Judge Christensen entered judgment dismissing the appellant's complaint. The judgment (Exhibit D-1) recited:
"That plaintiff's Amended Complaint
and the above entitled action and all claims
5

for relief asserted therein be and the same
hereby are dismissed on the grounds and for
the reasons that plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state facts upon which the relief demanded can be granted and this Court
is without jurisdiction on the subject matter
set for th therein, all in accordance with the
Memorandum Decision heretofore made and
entered herein."
It should be observed that the court dismissed
both on grounds of failure to state a claim for relief
and lack of jurisdiction.
Appellant thereafter took an appeal to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but subsequently
dismissed his appeal.
The instant action was dismissed by the trial
court on three grounds: ( 1) failure to state a claim
for relief, ( 2) voluntary waiver of his claim in federal court precluding his state action, and ( 3) res
judicata. It is submitted that each of these reasons
provided a correct basis for dismissal. The brief of
appellant contains some points that are apparently
directed to the basis of the trial court's decision but
they are so vaguely articulated that the respondent
will meet the appellant's brief on the basis of the
trial court's decision.
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S C 0 M P L A I N T FAILS TO
STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN
BE GRANTED.

The trial court dismissed the appellant's action
on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
6

claim for i·elief. The appellant spent little attention
in his brief on this issue. It is obvious that in this
case the concept of a cause of action for the sale of
control and the receipt of a premium for such a
sale is not applicable.
The essence of the claims of appellant is that
the i·esponclent obtained a premium for sale of his
stock ( 76.5 ~ ~ ) which should have been given to the
rnino1·ity shareholders. It should be noted that there
is no allegation that as a result of the sale to Inn·stors and the merger with National Western that
the corporation (National Western) has milked off
the asses ts of National Reliance or fraudulently
clealt with the former shareholders of National Reliance. At best, the pleading of the appellant asserts
that respondent received a premium which other
minority shareholders did not receive, that the sale
was consummated without their knowledge, and finally that a merger occurred resulting in a reduction
in the market value of the National Reliance stock.
These facts simply do not state a claim for relief.
It is a generally recognized rule that a shareholcle1·, especially a majority shareholder, has a right
to sell his stock for whatever price he can get for it,
and the fact that the price is more because of the
fact that the sale of the stock is a sale of control will
not give rise to a claim for relief. In Henn, Corporations, p. 384 ( 1961) it is observed:

"Shareholders generally, except when
they are subject to valid stock transfer re7

strictions, may sell their shares for whatever
price they can get, and a controlling block of
shares as a practical matter usually can be
sold at a higher price per share than other
shares. The dilemna, arising from the rules
that duties attach to the sale of control - on
the theory that control is a corporate asset
in which all shareholders have an equitable
interest and are entitled to share - but not
to the sale of the shares, is that a controlling
block of shares cannot be severed from its
appurtenant control and the price realized
from the sale of such block cannot readily be
allocated between the payment for such shares
per se and any premium for appurtenant control."
In 50 A.L.R. 2d 1148, it is obse1·ved:
"Inhe1·ent in the very natm·e of stock
corporations as constituted by our law are the
settled principles that the shares of stock are
the property of the stockholders, that the
stockholdel'S may sell their shares when and
to whom they please and for such price as
they can get, that the purchase price paid
upon such sales belongs to the sellers, and
that these same rights exists even where the
stockholders hold a majority of the stock and
where the sellers are a group who together
own and sell such a majority."
Thus respondent had a perfect right to sell his shares
and to obtain the full extrinsic value and worth of
the shares including their value because of the fact
they constituted majority control of the corporation.
There are, of course, cases which recognize that a
sale of control for the purposes of looting a corpora8

tion 01· defrauding minority shareholders is actionable, Gerdes vs. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1941); lnsunrnshares vs. Northern
Fiscol Col'p., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940), howeve1·, even in these cases it is recognized there may
be a legitimate sale of control of a corporation and
the receipt of a p1·emium. In the instant case there
is no allegation of looting nor anything comparable
to the facts of the Genies ancl Insunrnshares cases,
nor could appellant so plead with candor.
There is no doubt that c01·porate office may not
be sold, iWcClHl'i vs. Lmc, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388
( 1899), hut sale of stock accompanied by the resignation of office and the new control in the buyer is
legal. EsseJ; lJnivel'sol Corp. i·s. Yotes, 305 F. 2d
572 (2nd Cfr 1962); A1cCol'd vs. J1m·tin, 47 Cal.
App. 717, 191 Pac. 89 ( 1920).
In Esse.•; Universol Corp. vs. Yates, supra.,
Yates, the Chairman of Republic Pictures, entered
into a contract to sell his shares in Republic Pictures
Corp01·ation. He owned 28.3 c~ of the voting shares
and received a premium of about $2,000,000 above
the market price. The sale of the shares was to be
accompanied by the resignation of various officials,
thus transferring control. Yates subsequently refused to cany out the transaction and Essex sued.
Yates defended contending that the sale of control
for a premium was illegal. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Yates. On the appeal the
9

Second Circuit unanimously re\·ersed, 305 F. 2d
572 (2nd Cir. 1962). Judge Lumbard found no
illegality in the sale or the pre mi um, including the
resignation of directol'S and officers (a factor not
contracted for as alleged in the pleadings). He
stated:
"Essex was, however, contracting with
Yates for the purchase of a \·ery substantial
percentage of Republic stock. If, by ,·irtue of
the \·oting power carried by this stock, it
could have elected a majority of the board of
directors then the contract was not a simple
agreement for the sale of office to one having
no ownership interest in the corporation, and
the question of its legality would require further analysis. Such stock \·oting control would
incontestably belong to the owner of the majority of the voting stock, and it is commonly
knO\vn that equfralent power usually accrues
to the owner of 28.3 r ~ of the stock.

*

*

*

"There is no question of the right of a
controller shareholder under New York law
normally to derive a premium from the sale
of a controlling block of stock. In other words,
there was no impropriety per se in the fact
that Yates was to receive more per share than
the generally prevailing market price for Republic stock. Levy vs. American Beverage
Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 218, 38 N. Y.S. 2d
517 526 (1st Dept. 1942) ; Stanton vs.
Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y.S. 221 (N.Y.
County Sup. Ct. 1931) ; see Hill, supra, 70
Harv. L. Rev. at 991-92.
"The next question is whether it is legal
to gi,·e and receive payment for the immedi10

ate transfe1· of management control to one
who has achieved majority share control but
would not otherwise be able to convert that
shai·e control into operating control for some
time. I think that it is."
The court relied in part on Barnes vs. Brown,
50 N.Y. 527 (1880) upholding the right to sell corpm·ate conti·ol and i·eceive a premium if there were
no scheme to loot or injm·e minority shareholders.
J uclge Friendly, concurring noted:
''Hence, I am inclined to think that if I
were sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, I \Vould hold a provision like Paragraph
6 ,·iolative of public policy save when it was
entirely plain that a new election would be a
me1·e fo1·mality - i.e., when the seller owned
more than 50' ~ of the stock."
Even taking the more conservative view of
.Judge Friendly the1·e is no basis f01· complaint in
the instant case since the appellant alleges that respondent owned 76.5 :~ of the shares of National
Reliance. Therefore, Essex supports the trial court's
ruling dismissing appellant's complaint. For a discussion of the Essex case clearly drawing the distinction between sales of majority conti·ol with premium, and sale of control for purposes which indicate the buyer's intention to "loot" the corporation
see Bayne, The Sale-Of-Confrol Quandry, 51 Cornell Law Quarterly 49 ( 1965). The author's conclusions would support affirmance in this case.
Numerous other cases have found the circumstances as alleged by the appellant insufficient to
11

grant recovery. In 111cCord vs. lVJartin, 47 Cal. App.
717, 191 Pac. 89 ( 1920) the Secretary of a corporation sold his shares for $15.00 per share if
other shareholders sold their shares for $5.00 (a
questionable condition not present here), even so,
the appellant court found no improper action and
ruled for defendant.
A similar result was reached by the New J ersey Court in the case of a sale to a competitor in
Keely vs. Black, 91 N.J.Eq. 520, Ill Atl. 22 ( 1920).
The fact that sale of control may be made to a competitor is not of consequence unless the sale creates
a "void" in the market (a situation the court could
take judicial notice did not occur in the insurance
industry in Utah). Perlman vs. Feldnwnn, 219 F.
2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1955). But in Essex Universal
Corp. vs. Yates, supra, the court apparently completely discounted the fact of a possible transfer to
a competitor.
The New York Court in Levy vs. American
Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S. 2cl
517 ( 1942) noted that a claim that a majority
shareholder made a sale of the control of the corporation and received an amount in excess of the
market value of his stock would not support recovery. The court in deciding the matter spoke in terms
very meaningful to the appellant's claim in this case.
It stated:
"The present case does not involve a
charge that the majority stockholders bene12

fited at the expense of the minority. That
charge, howeve1·, i·ests solely on the claim that
more was received by appellants for their stock
than it was bringing in the open market. The
difference between market price and liquidating value would indicate that the market
price of small lots of stock did not reflect its
intrinsic wm·th especially of controlling stock.
Realization of more than the market price
would not, unde1· such circumstances, be indicative of fraud, nm· afford the minority stockholclel'S any i·ight of action. Nor would the
fact that purchasers were willing to pay a
la1·ge1· price to one holding control necessarily
make the receipt of an increased price improper or indicate any unlawful intention on
the part of the purchasers. Control might
hm'e lawful advantages. Fo1· instance, if corporate control fo1· the purpose of merger, or
some similar object, was desired by the purchasers for legitimate purposes, undoubtedly
they would pay more for a controlling interest. \Ve see no reason why the value of control
would not be a lawful property right of the
controlling stockholders, at least to the extent
that it is reflected in the price they may obtain for their stock in an honest sale."
In Tryon vs. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P. 2d
251 ( 1951) an action was brought alleging "fraud"
in the sale of shares of bank stock by the former
president to a third-party corporation. The majority
shareholders had sold the stock for more than the
minority received and no disclosure of the difference
was made. The Oregon Supreme Court sustained
13

the action for the defendants. In so holding the court
observed:
''It is generally held that majority stockholders may sell their stock at any time and
for any price obtainable without informing
other stockholders of the price or terms of
sale, provided they act in good faith (citing
many cases and au th01·ities) .

*

* *
"There being no fiduciary relationship
existing between the stockholders of the bank
so far as the sale of individual stock was concerned, there was no duty upon the pa1·t of
Smith to apprise minority stockholders of
Transamerica's offer. The fact that Smith
et.al. received more for their stock than the
minority is no evidence of fraHd, since it is
generally recognized that the stock of majority stockholders is of m01·e value than that of
the minority."
Thus, the allegations of the appellant's petition
really do not sustain the right to relief.
The Arizona Supreme Court in Goode vs. Pozcers, 97 Ariz. 75, 397 P. 2d 56 ( 1964) had occasion
to consider a factual situation very similar to the
Essex rule above and reached the same conclusion.
The court held a contract for sale of control, with
resignation of officers and granting of proxies plus
a $500/$200 sale versus market price ratio gave no
basis for relief. The court relied on the Oregon case
in Tryon vs. Smith, supra, and ruled there was no
cause of action on sale of control or the granting of
14

a premium. A similar result was reached in Levy
vs. Arnerican Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208,
38 N.Y.S. 2d 517 (1942).
The appellant contends that Birnbaum vs. United States Steel, 193 F. 2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1952) and
Palmcm vs. Feldnwnn, supra support this claim on
appeal.
The Birnbaum case was an action under Rule
10 ( b )-5 similar to that brought by appellant in federal court in this case. Further the court did not indicate in Birnbaum that a cause of action would be
stated under New York law on the facts pleaded, but
me1·ely dismissed the action under federal law finding no fraud perpetrated on the purchaser or seller
of securities as i·equired by 15 U.S.C. § 78 and Rule
10 (b )-5. Further, the facts in Birnbaum show the
corporate officers rejected a profitable transaction
in favo1· of all stockholders in order to meet their
own special interests. No such allegations are set
nut in this case.
The decision in Perlnwn vs. Feldmann, supra,
is also inopposi te to the pleadings in this case. The
decision is one involving the Birnham case and the
sale of corporate control and looting of a steel company. It was decided by the United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit under Indiana law. The
sale was by Feldmann, but he owned only 33 <;c of the
1

'The court noted there was no Indiana case in point and so
applied New York and other cases by analogy.
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stock and a1Tangec1 for the transfer of 37 1, r of the
stock gi,·ing minority ownership, a fact not present
in this case. Furthe1·, the transfer "closed" the
market during a time of market shortage of steel
thus giving the receiving company a monopolistic
position. No allegations of a like nature ai·e made
in this case. Indeed life insurance is a commodity
where the industi·y is in open competition in Utah.
Further, Feldmann transferred the stock in the face
of another possible merger that would have benefited all shareholders. A simple reading of the case
against the complaint and allied evidence before this
court demonstrates its inapplicability.
Further, subsequent to Perlman the Second
Circuit has reti·eated from its position, Essr:e [!niversal Corp. vs. Yates, supra, which may be because
New York and other state courts have seemed to
feel that absent the special facts extant in Feldmmrn
the sale of control for a premium is not per se bad.
Bemori vs. Brcrnn, 155 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (1956).
In Newman and Pickering, A Pre1nimn for
Control, 28 Texas Bar Journal 735, 781 (1965) it is
observed:
"Some of the writers who have argued
for per se liability have cited Perlman vs.
Feldmann as the primary authority for their
position. The more recent Essex decision by
the Second Circuit, however, repudiates this
view. Moreover, in all of the simple sales cases
where liability has been found, the selling
stockholder, knew or should have known that
16

after the sale the c01·poration or the other
stockholders would suffer more detriment
that they probably would not otherwise have
incurred."
In Ryder vs. Hamburger, 172 Cal. 791, 158 Pac.
753 ( 1916) the California court held no cause of
action shown for sale, rnerge1·, and control with a
premium to Hamburger on the sale of Salt Lake
Oil Company. The facts are comparable to those
pleaded here. Utah law was apparently applicable
without specific p1·ecedent being found to govern.
Another case that supports the trial court's action
here is Keely vs. Black, 91 N.J.Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22
(N.J. Ct. Errors & App. 1920). Also it should be
noted that since the appellant claimed a cause of
action based on the breach of a fiduciary duty tantamount to fraud he had the obligation to plead with
pa1·ticularity. Rule 9 (b) U.R.C.P. provides in part:
"In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stat€d with particularity."
The1·efore, the trial court could, in weighing whether a claim was in fact stated, look at the actual facts
pleaded as distinct from the conclusions. In this case
they show no more than a mere sale of control for
a premium.
It is submitted the court correctly ruled that
appellant had not stated a claim for relief.
17

POINT II
THE ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT \VAS
RES JUDI CAT A.

The Appellant, Robert I. Cohne, filed a suit in
the United States District Court for the District of
Utah on August 5, 1965, against the respondent and
others, including Investors and National Western,
mentioned in the appellant's present complaint. The
same allegations of ownership and control of stock
were made against the respondent. Appellant also
purported to represent a class, and also to bring a
derivative action for National Reliance, the same as
was done in this case. Jurisdiction of Count I was
based on 15 U.S.C., Sec. 78j; Sec. lOb of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule lOb-5.
The same essential allegations raised in Count I of
the federal complaint are now raised in Count I of
the appellant's complaint before this court. Count
II of the federal complaint was essentially the same
action as Count II of the present action and purported to be brought under Rule 23 (b) F.R.C.P.
Therefore, the federal action was essentially the
same action except that the appellant relied on the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for jurisdiction
and the legal framework of the cause of action. Rule
lOb-5 makes actionable the use of any "device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud," or "to engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
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any security." The legal framework of the rule was
comparable to the common law basis of the appellant's present action.
Subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint
in federal court, appellant filed an amended complaint alleging the same legal basis for jurisdiction
but also claiming the respondent's acts to give rise
"pendent to claims arising under and based solely"
on Rule lOb-5. Thus, appellant initially invoked the
''pendent" jurisdiction of the federal court. On
March 7, 1966, appellant expressly waived any pendent claims in federal court and that portion of the
amended complaint was striken. The amended complaint purp01·ted to raise the same general issues
but was framed in the nature of a conspiracy complaint. After substantial argument on the question
of the court's jurisdiction and whether a claim for
relief was stated, the Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Judge, entered a memorandum decision on
July 6, 1966. He concluded:
:!

"I have concluded, in view of the cases
cited by counsel in the briefs and in reasonable interpretation of the statute, that there
can be no recovery under the allegations of
the complaint of a premium on profits from a
sale of control; that a sufficient 10 (b) claim
is not stated; that there is no reliance shown
by any purchaser or seller of any security or
' Contrary to the implication in appellant's brief the court
did not strike the pendent claims on its own finding but
did so only after an express waiver of those claims by appellant's counsel.
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in connection with a pm·chase 01· sale; that
the merger as pleaded is not a sale, nor was
it effected in connection with a sale of securities within the contemplation of the statute,
and that the theory of fraud in connection
with proxy solicitations does not sustain
plaintiff's claims as stated."
On September 22, 1966, the federal court entered a final order dismissing the appellant's complaint. The order recited:
"That plaintiff's Amended Complaint
and the above entitled action and all claims
for relief asserted therein be and the same
hereby are dismissed on the grounds and for
the reasons that plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state facts upon which the relief demanded can be granted and this court
is without jurisdiction of the subject matter
set forth therein, all in accordance with the
Memorandum Decision he1·etofore made ancl
ente1·ed herein."
It should be noted that the memorandum decision of the court found no claim stated "under the
allegations of the complaint of a premium on profits
for sale of control." Further, the order dismissed because no claim was stated.
The respondent submits the federal action is
now res judicata. The contention is based on two
theories. First, that since the federal court found
the facts pleaded in the federal action to state no
basis for relief under a theory of premium of control, that determination of law when coupled with
the order dismissing for failure to state a claim in
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addition to jm·isdiction settled the "law of the case"
between the parties on the facts alleged and hence
no claim for relief is stated under this complaint.
The Restatenient of Judgnients, Sec. 70 observes:
"\Vhere a question of law essential to the
judgment is actually litigated and determined
by a valid and final personal judgment, the
determination is not conclusive between the
parties in a subsequent action on a different
cause of action, except where both causes of
action arose out of the same subject matter
or transaction .... "
In this case, as noted above, the claim of appellant arises out of the same transaction and is therefore baned.
Comment b. to the above section of the Restatement notes, p. 320:
"\\'here a question of law is actually litigated and determined in an action, the determination is ordinarily conclusive between the
parties in a subsequent action involving the
same subject matter or transaction, although
based upon a different cause of action from
that upon which the original action was based."
It is, therefore, submitted the action should be
deemed res judicata.

The second, and more primary theory upon
which respondent claims the cause of action to be
barred is based upon the contention that if appellant had a claim for i·elief against the respondent
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under state law at the time of the federal action it
could have been sustained under the court's pendent
jm·isdiction, and having expressly waived any pendent claims in that action the appellant may not now
maintain this case in Utah courts.
This requires first an appreciation of federal
pendent jurisdiction. In Osborn vs. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 ( 1824) the
United States Supreme Court recognized that where
a federal question is raised under the judicial authority of the United States, the federal court would
necessarily have the power to decide the whole cause
even though non-federal issues were presented.
The Osborn decision was "expanded" in Silel'
vs. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175
( 1909). In that case the court observed:
"The Federal questions as to the inYalidi ty of the state statute because, as alleged,
it was in violation of the Federal Constitution, gave the circuit court jurisdiction and,
having properly obtained it, that court had
the right to decide all the questions in the
case, even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or
even if it omitted to decide them at all, but
decided the case on local or state questions
only."
Thus, the court seems clearly to recognize that
a state issue clearly tied into the federal issue could
be decided even if the federal issue were not decided
or decided adversely to the party. In the instant case
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the federal basis of jurisdiction and the claim for
relief were expressly decided adverse to the appellant and appellant had originally pleaded the contention that the claims were at least supportable as
pendent claims under state law. This basis was,
thereafter, expressly waived by the appellant. Hence,
he could have maintained the action under the pendent power of the federal court and elected not to
do so. That election now precludes the action in this
co mt
\Vright, Federal Com· ts, p. 56 ( 1963) it is obse1Ted:
"In fact the state regulation was held
invalid on state grounds, and the court declared this preferable to an unnecessary determination of federal constitutional questions. This rule, that the federal court need
not, and perhaps should not, decide the federal issue but may resolve the case entirely
on state grounds is not, as the Osborn rule
was, a rule of necessity. It is, however, a useful rule. It avoids decision of constitutional
questions where possible, and it permits one
lawsuit, rather than two, to resolve the entire
controversy."
Appellant consequently had full opportunity to
have the issue decided as a pendent issue in the
federal action.
In Hurn vs. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), the
Supreme Court again observed as to pendent jurisdiction:
"But the rule does not go so far as to
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permit a ferleral court to assume jurisdiction
of a separate and distinct non-federal cause
of action because it is joined in the same complaint with a federal cause of action. The distinction to be observed is between a case where
two distinct grounds in support of a single
cause of action are alleged, one only of which
presents a federal question, and a case where
two separate and distinct causes of action are
alleged, one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the
non-federal ground; in the latter it may not
do so upon the non-federal cause of action."
The instant claim of violation of state law was
based on the same facts claimed to violate federal
law, and hence, was not a "separate and distinct"
claim for relief. The federal trial court, therefore,
had jurisdiction to settle the claim of state law violating arising from the same facts, and at least had
discretion to hear the matter. Note Discretionary
Federal Jurisdiction Over the Pendent Cause, 46
Ill. L. Rev. 646 ( 1951). Appellant abandoned the
opportunity for federal pendent jurisdiction and,
thus, abandoned its opportunity to have the state
claim decided in the first action. This is res judicata
under Utah law.
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In East Mill Creek Water Co. vs. Salt Lake
City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P. 2d 863 ( 1952) the Utah
Supreme Court observed:
" * * * there a1·e two kinds of cases where
the doctrine of res judicata is applied: In the
one former action is an absolute bar to the
maintenance of the second; it usually bars
the successful party as well as the loser; it
must be between the same parties or their
privies; it applies not only to points and issues which are actually raised and decided
therein but also to such as could have been
therein adjudicated, but it only applies where
the claim, demand or cause of action is the
same in both cases. In such case the court's
hold that the parties should litigate their entire claim, demand and cause of action, and
every party, issue and ground thereof, and if
one of the parties fails to raise any point or
issue or to litigate any part of his claim, demand or cause of action and the matter goes
to final judgment, such party may not again
litigate that claim, demand or cause of action
or any issue, point or part thereof which he
could have but failed to litigate in the former
action. On the other hand where the claim,
demand or cause of action is different in the
two cases then the former is res judicata of
the latter only to the extent that the former
actually raised and decided the same points
and issues which are raised in the latter."

In Wheadon vs. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376
P. 2d 946 (1962) an action was brought to establish a right of way by implied easement. A previous
action had been brought on the theory of prescrip25

tive easement. The Utah Court held the second action was res judicata since the appellant could have
raised the issue in the first action. The court cited
the East Mill Creek Water case and stated:
"We believe that the above-quoted statement supports the rule of the lower court.
Here, we have the same parties litigating the
same subject matter - an asserted right of
way over defendants' property. While plaintiff's endeavored to establish this right of way
by prescriptive easement in the first action,
the issue or theory of implied easement, now
urged in this second action, could have been
urged and adjudicated in the first action.
This is particularly true under our Rules of
Civil Procedure which expressly permits hrn
or more statements of a claim.
"Policy would seem to indicate that when
a plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his
entire relief, based upon his entire claim, then
the matter should be laid at rest. He should
be denied a second attempt at substantially
the same objective under a different guise."
Since appellant herein had every opportunity
to assert the same claim he now urges at the time
the case was in federal court because of the court's
pendent jurisdiction, and having expressly waived
the pendent claim, no action may now be maintained.
Supporting this conclusion is Jocie Motor Lines, Inc.
vs. Johnson, 231 N.C. 367, 57 S.E. 2d 388 (1950);
Horne vs. Woolever, 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E. 2cl
378 ( 1959). In each case the court found the plaintiff had an action it could have asserted in federal
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coud and didn't. The courts ruled the action in state
court barred.
The appellant attemps to draw a distinction
between pendent substantive jurisdiction and pendent procedural jurisdiction based on the extraterrit01·ial process allowed in suit brought for violations
of Rule lOb-5 (Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa). Appellant relies upon Trussell vs. United Underivriters, Ltd.
286 F. Supp. 801 (D.C. Colo. 1964). The Trussell
case does draw such a distinction, but it still affords
the appellant no relief. First other lower federal
com·ts have taken the opposite view.
In Cooper vs. North Jersey Trust Company, 226
F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), Judge Feinberg had
a situation comparable to the situation as this case
existed when it was before Judge Christensen.
Claims were based on Rule lOb-5 and also on a pendent state basis. A motion to dismiss the state
claims on the theory of pendent jurisdiction because
it was an attempt to secure not substantive jurisdiction but procedural jm·iscliction by non-resident service. The Court stated:
"Having dealt with defendant's attacks
on plaintiff's claims which are concededly
federal in nature, the next most important
issue raised by the motion to dismiss is whether this Court has acquired personal jurisdiction over Trust Co. with regard to the nonfederal theories for relief. There is no dispute
that the only service made upon Trust Co.
was extra-territorial service in New Jersey
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under Section 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
The question raised is whether such service
gives the Court personal jurisdiction over
Trust Co. to grant the relief sought under
the non-security act legal theories for relief
- the claims alleging conversion, breach of
fiduciary duty and negligence. The District
Courts which have considered this question
appear to be in disagreement though the majority of these decisions deny such jurisdiction. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union vs. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Kappus vs. \"\'estern Hills
Oil, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 123 (E.D.Wis. 1959);
J aypen Holdings, Ltd. vs. Bellanca Corp., 22
F.R.D. 190 (D.N.J. 1958); Lasch vs. Antkies,
161 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa.1958). Cases indicating that such jurisdiction is proper are:
Townsend Corp. of America vs. Davidson,
222 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1963); Collings vs.
Bush Mfg. Co., 19 F.R.D. 297 (S.D.N.Y
1956) (dictum) ; Stella \·s. Kaiser, 82 F.
Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (without discussion). If service of Trust Co. were properly
made, the Court would have subject matter
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought after
trial on the non-federal legal theories under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, since all
of the claims here are but different theories
for relief for violation of a single right. Hurn
vs. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S. Ct. 586, 77
L. Ed. 1148 (1933); Brown vs. Bullock, 194
F. Supp. 207, 220 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.
2d 415 (2 Cir. 1961) ; International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union vs. Shields & Co.,
supra at 147-48 of 209 F. Supp.
"The reasons of judicial economy which justify the judicially created doctrine
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of pendent jm·isdiction - suggest sustaining the service of process as to the pendent
non-federal claims. See Note, 63 Colum. L.
Rev. 762 ( 1963). The same basic facts will
have to be presented on both federal and nonfederal theories. Service on the federal claims
is proper and defense of these claims must,
in any event be made in this District.
"The Court of Appeals for this circuit
had occasion to consider this problem in
Schwartz vs. Eaton, 264 F. 2d 195 (2 Cir.
1959). Suit in the District Court was brought
for violation of the Investment Company Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-52, as well as on nonf ederal grounds. The lower court struck from
the complaint the non-federal theories of recovery and quashed service of process as to
them, holding that service pursuant to a statute authorizing nationwide service does not
give personal jurisdiction over a defendant so
served upon pendent theories for recovery.
Schwartz vs. Bowman, 156 F. Supp. 361,
364-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). An appeal from this
order of the District Court was dismissed for
lack of finality. 264 F. 2d at 196. However,
the Court of Appeals wrote that (264 F. 2d at
197-98):
'[f] rom every angle the district
court's action in attempting to dismiss
a part of plaintiff's legal theories appears a nullity. The striking of a portion of the prayer for relief was surely
a futile and meaningless gesture. F.R.
54 ( c) * * And the trial judge at the
close of the case will still be obligated
to grant the parties the relief to which
they prove themselves entitled. * * So
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every consideration of trial convenience for litigants and courts accords
with the legal principle pointing to a
complete determination of this controversy at one time.'
'\Ve add that we can perceive no
additional hardship upon the defendants here in expecting them to defend
their actions against claims of violation
of state law, as well as for rescission
under the federal statute.'
"Judge Moore concurred in the result,
but dissented as to the view that the lower
court had personal jurisdiction to decide the
non-federal theories.
"In an opinion subsequent to Schwartz,
Judge Dimock, the author of Schwartz in the
District Court, has reiterated his views. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
vs. Shields & Co., supra. Holding that there
was pendent subject matter jurisdiction over
the non-federal theories, the Court, in distinguishing pendent subject matter jurisdiction from pendent personal jurisdiction, stated that the former "flows of necessity from
the conception that there is but a single claim
where a single right has been violated." 209
F. Supp at 148. However, the fact that there
is a single claim does not foreclose separate
trial on rights to relief created by different
sovereigns in the courts of those sovereigns.
Interpreting Schwartz as meaning that the
action of the District Court was not effective
in foreclosing relief on the non-federal theory,
the Court in International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union stated that the issue can be
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limited in the pre-trial order as whether there
was a violation only of the federal law.
"With all i·espect, I must disagree. Although the Comt in Schwartz indicated as
one of its grounds of disapproval of the action
in the lower court that full relief must be
granted even though not asked for [Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54 ( c)], its objection to the disposition of the issue of pendent personal jurisdiction cannot be cured merely by the device of
a pre-trial order. Although much of Schwartz
is concededly dictum, the Court indicated that
it felt adjudication of the non-federal claims
is proper. This is clearly indicated by the discussion of hardship and judicial convenience.
Judge Moore's opinion interpreted the language of the majority to mean this.
"In the present state of the law, I am inclined to follow the dictum in Schwartz because ( 1) it indicates the feeling of the Circuit Court, and (2) it conforms with the interests of justice in avoiding piece-meal litigation. In this respect, the Court notes that
the new amendments to Rule 4 (f), Fed. R.
Civ. P. reflect the policy of judicial economy
at the sacrifice of state borders.
"Accordingly, insofar as the motion to
dismiss alleges lack of personal jurisdiction
over the non-federal claims, it will be denied."
It should be noted that the only appellate authority would be contrary to the position urged by the
respondent. In addition it is questionable if Judge
Fienberg's "case counting" is accurate. See 5 ALR
3rd 1057. Further, the reasoning of the legal scholars seems to support the Fienberg thesis of assum31

ing pendent jurisdiction in such cases. 63 Col. L.
Rev. 762 (1963); 72 Har. L. Rev. 773 (1959); 51
Iowa L. Rev. 151 ( 1965) ; 107 Pa. L. Rev. 714
(1959). However, this court need not decide between competing federal courts since in this case the
same issue was involved in the federal and pendent
claims and appellant waived the state claim in federal court. In Trussell, Judge Doy le had observed:
"We are not persuaded by these reasons
because we do not agree that quashing the
service of process for the pendent claims will
necessarily require relitigation in another
court of the same issues which will have been
litigated in this Court. Since the same questions of fact between the same parties are involved, collateral estoppel should make a mere
formality of a separate suit on the pendent
claims. Myers vs. International Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 64, 44 S. Ct. 86, 68 L. Ed. 165
( 1923); Partmar Corp. vs. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, 74 S. Ct.
414, 98 L. Ed 532 ( 1954) ."
Judge Doyle was not faced at his level with a
complete waiver of the pendent claims which is what
occurred in the federal court in this case. Further,
in Judge Christensen's Comt the whole attack was
on the substantive issue. If the pendent claims had
not been waived they could have been litigated on
their merits, if any. By first abandoning the alleged
cause and now attempting to resurrect it in the state
court the circuity of litigation. Judge Fienberg's
ruling, and that of the Second Circuit, Schwartz vs.
Eaton, 264 F. 2d 195 (2nd Cir. 1957), would cure
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has occured. In such a case the 10th Circuit has indicated the pa1·ty who abandoned the action is barred. In Crist vs. United Underwriters, 343 F. 2d 902
(10th Cir. 1965) it was observed (after Trussell) :
"The complaint also alleges a cause of
action based on the Kansas "Blue Sky Law"
(§§ 17-1253, 17-1254, 17-1255, 17-1258, 1959
Supp. Kan. Gen. Stats. 1949). This act expressly provides a cause of action to a purchaser of securities under stated circumstances. From the record it appears that a
motion is pending to dismiss this cause of
action, but on this appeal the cause is still in
the case. The appallents have taken the appeal and presented the case entirely on the
federal cause of action and no other. If there
was any basis to support the writs on the
cause of action based on the Kanas statutes,
it has been waived by the parties and need not
be he1·e considered."
Since appellant expressly waived his state claim
he is barred from now reasserting it in state court
and the trial court properly so ruled below.
If this court should decide to view the matter
on the issue of the full extent of pendent jurisdiction the trial court's ruling based on Hurn vs. Oursler, supra is the proper ruling to avoid piece-meal
litigation. See also case recognizing pendent jurisdiction of state claims in Federal Securities Act
suits, 5 ALR 3rd§ 26, p. 1115 and§ 4 p. 1057. The
appellant should not be allowed to have his cake
here after having ate it in federal court.
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POINT III
APPELLANT IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED
TO BRING THIS ACTION.

The appellant's action below was the same as he
brought in federal court. Judge Christensen found
the facts stated no claim for relief under Rule lOb-.)
or §10 ( b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934. He
found no action was stated under the "Complaint of
a premium on profits from sale of control; that a
sufficient lO(b) claim is not stated; that there is no
i·eliance shown ... "
It may be assumed that an action unde1· Rule
lOb-.~ may vary to some degree from the common
law fraud action they no\v seek under the guise of
sale of control. Howe,·er, the elements of the two
actions ai·e similar in several instances and the
lOb-5 rule is less rigid. Thus, if appellant could not
plead an action under Rule lOb-5 they could not sustain a common law fraud action. Compare Stevens
vs. Vowells, 343 F. 37 4 (10th Cir. 1965) with
Stucki vs. Delta Land and Wate1· Co., 63 Utah 495,
227 Pac. 971 ( 1924).
Judge Christensen ruled no claim for relief
under the pleaded facts on a theory of premium of
control. The facts there pleaded are the full facts
that the appellant may rely on to support his contentions. \\1 hen these facts, as noted above, are sep34

arated from the conclusionary pleading, they do not
support a cause of action under the theory of premium of control or common law fraud. This is what
Judge Christensen in part ruled. In the Restatement of Judgments, Sec. 68, Comment f., it is observed:
"If a question of fact is put in issue by

the pleadings, and at the trial the fact is admitted and in consequence no proof is offered
by the party having the burden of proof, the
question is litigated and a judgment is conclusive between the parties as to the questions."
The facts of appellant's complaint have been
admitted for purposes of respondent's motions to
dismiss the matter submitted on the pleadings and
the federal court finding no basis for a claim, the
appellant is estopped to proceed in this action.
Nor can it be said that the federal court ruled
merely that it had no jurisdiction. A simple reading
of the memorandum decision of Judge Christensen
and the final order in the context of the briefs submitted makes clear he went beyond that basis. Even
so the facts pleaded and found insufficient result in
a bar to the same facts being pleaded in this case
to support a claim for relief similar in nature but
requiring an even greater burden.
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CONCLUSION

Appellant seeks two bites at the same apple,
and a bad apple at that. His complaint failed to
state a claim for relief as has been clearly shown.
Second, he expressly waived the same cause of action in federal court as he now seeks to maintain.
To now allow such action is contrary to sound judicial administration since it promotes multiple and
circuiteous litigation. It is submitted the trial court
correctly dismissed the litigation and this court
should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
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